THE TRUTH IS STILL TOLD

She insists that she has been found guilty of FELONY contempt of
court. Doesn't that make her, by her own argument, a FELON?

p.13, bottom...

"What she posts on the internet is readily available on many other
websites and is far less than what is available to any layperson in
bookstores or through orders from legal publishers, such as West and
Lexis."

Does that make Hher a plagiarizer? Rather, it makes her USELESS at
best.

p.14, top...

"What Ms. Shell does in her passionate (and totally uncompensated)
efforts to advocate for and defend the rights of families and
parents, is protected by the First Amendment."

TOTALLY UNCOMPENSATED = zero damages, people. Am I right?

p.14, middle...

"She is not practicing law when she directs an attorney as to what she
thinks he should do for his clients, or when she tells the parents of
her efforts."

Um, when it's LEGAL ADVICE, then yeah it is, which she stipulated to:
"...(2) that the "practice of law" includes activities such as
OFFERING LEGAL ADVICE and drafting or selecting legal documents for
use by another person in a legal proceeding, and..." (emphasis mine)
p. 3 of UPL judgement

SOURCE: Right Click save Target AS

No. _

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

SUZANNE SHELL.

------------------------------PetitlOner,------------------------------- --- ----

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO,

Respondent.

Paul Grant

Centennial, Colorado 80111

(303) 771-1908

Counsel for Petitioner

right of Petitioner to a jury trial in a serious criminal contempt proceeding where

Petitioner was denied ajury trial in defending against a charge ofviolating a court order

enjoining her from the unauthorized practice of law, insofar as her punishment - - a

punitive fine of $6000 - - constitutes a felony-level punishment because it exceeds

Colorado's statutory limits for punishment for any misdemeanor offense.

II. Was Ms. Shell denied her First Amendment right to petition her government and her right

to freedom of association where she was tried and found guilty of contempt of court in

part for presenting her own complaint for civil rights violations in a federal district court

punished for exercising her First Amendment rights to free speech and freedom of

association where she was convicted of contempt and fined for communicating her

recommendations in dependency and neglect cases to a licensed attorney, where she

provided copies of those recommendations to the parents involved in dependency and

neglect proceedings, and where the parents subsequently used her recommendations in

proceedings.

III. Was Ms. Shell denied her First Amendment rights and her Fourteenth Amendment due

process rights where she was charged with and found guilty of contempt for engaging in

of law are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

1

IV. Was Ms. Shell denied federal due process protections when she was denied a copy of her

trial transcript for use in her appeal, where no transcript was ever prepared, not even for

the court. Only her own videotape (held by the court after trial) of the trial and DVDs she

made from the tapes, are included with the record, and there is no indication in the

Opinion that any member of the Colorado Supreme Court ever tried to view that

videotape or viewed the DVD's made from the tapes. There is no official record of the

trial testimony because the court reporter's notes were never transcribed.

11

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions Presented For Review

Table of Contents

Table of Authorities

Opinions Below

Jurisdiction

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

Statement ofthe Case

Reasons for Allowing the Writ

1

111

IV

1

1

1

3

14

I. Ms. Shell is engaged in protected political expression

and political association and petitioning the government

when she advocates for the rights of parents, and when she

she hosts a website and posts pleadings from other cases, and

when she joins with others to sue the government for civil

rights violations, and Colorado cannot stifle such activities

under the pretext of regulating the unauthorized practice of law. 14

II. Colorado Should Not Be Allowed to Deny the Sixth

Amendment-guaranteed right to a jury trial in serious criminal

contempt proceedings - - i.e., where the punishment is as severe

as for a state felony - - simply because Colorado does not call

criminal contempt a serious offense. 15

Conclusion 16

111

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

United States Constitution, Amendment I

United States Constitution, Amendment VI

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV

§ 18-1.3-401, Colorado Revised Statutes (2006)

§18-1.3-501, Colorado Revised Statutes (2006)

IV

1

1

2

3,9

2,9,10

The Opinion and Judgment of the Colorado Supreme Court finding Petitioner guilty

of contempt of court were issued December 18, 2006, and a copy of the published Opinion of

the court is attached in the Appendix.

Colorado Supreme Court jurisdiction to try Ms. Shell for criminal contempt was

invoked pursuant to Rule 107 and Rules 238-240, Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. The

Colorado Supreme Court claims its authority to regulate the unauthorized practice of law

Court to review the judgment of the Colorado Supreme Court, is invoked pursuant to 28

U.S. Const., Amend. I provides:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment ofreligion, or prohibiting the

free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right

ofthe people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of

gnevances.

U.S. Const., Amend. VI provides:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public

trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been

committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be

1

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses

against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to

have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV provides, in part:

Section 1.

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction

thereof, are citizens ofthe United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State

shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of

citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person oflife, liberty, or

property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection ofthe laws.

Class

1

2

3

Minimum Sentence

Six months imprisonment

or five hundred dollars, or

both

Three months imprisonment,

or two hundred fifty dollar fine,

or both

Fifty dollars fine

2

Maximum Sentence

Eighteen months imprisonment

or five thousand dollar fine, or both

Twelve months imprisonment

or one thousand dollar fine, or both

Six months imprisonment or seven

hundred fifty dollars fine, or both

(III) (A) As to any person sentenced for a felony committed on or after July I, 1985, except as

otherwise provided in sub-subparagraph (E) ofthis subparagraph (III), in addition to, or in lieu

of, any sentence to imprisonment, probation, community corrections, or work release, a fine

within the following presumptive ranges may be imposed for the specified classes of felonies:

Class Minimum Sentence Maximum Sentence

1

2

3

4

5

6

No fine

Five thousand dollars

Three thousand dollars

Two thousand dollars

One thousand dollars

One thousand dollars

No fine

One million dollars

Seven hundred fifty thousand dollars

Five hundred thousand dollars

One hundred thousand dollars

One hundred thousand dollars

Petitioner Suzanne Shell is a documentary film producer and a nationally known

activist and advocate for family rights and parental rights for families involved in dependency

and neglect proceedings and in other proceedings involving child protective services agencies.

Her website can be found at www.profane-justice.org She is an outspoken critic of legal

processes which abuse the rights offamilies and parents and she is not a licensed attorney.

In her earlier activities, prior to her activities related to the contempt charges in this

3

case, Ms. Shell had drafted pleadings for parents involved in court cases, thinking that she

could do so as the attorney-in-fact for the parents based on the [Colorado] statutory powers of

attorney given to her by the parents. In a previous Colorado Supreme Court proceeding

against Ms. Shell, she had consented to the entry of an injunction against the future

unauthorized practice of law, and she had agreed that she would not draft pleadings any more.

She did not agree, nor was she required, to take down her web site, where she had

posted pleadings used in other cases. The horne page ofher website did (and does still)

contain her notice that she was not an attorney and a warning that persons concerned with

exercising their rights should consult with an attorney:

COPYRIGHT 1996-2007 SUZANNE SHELL reproduction

without written permission is prohibited

Ms. Shell also did not agree to stop communicating with parents concerning the abuses

ofvarious court proceedings and of "child protection" agencies. She sought to help parents

find resources to protect their rights. And she communicated to the parents' lawyers what she

agree to give up her First Amendment rights.

Petitioner Shell was cited for contempt of court and threatened with a punishment of

4

fine or imprisonment on March 29,2004, for allegedly violating the previous Supreme Court

injunction against her engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. Ms. Shell supposedly

alleging that her First Amendment rights had been violated by several individuals involved in

dependency and neglect cases, including a county attorney and two private attorneys, the

Fremont County District Court, and the Fremont County Department ofHuman Services. Ms.

Shell allowed a parent involved in a dependency and neglect case to review the complaint and

(as well as on her own behalf) because the mother could not be present when the lawsuit was

being filed in Denver. The mother signed all subsequent pleadings on her own behalf; (2) for

involving herself with parents in two dependency and neglect matters in Fremont County

District Court, where Ms. Shell obtained powers of attorney (using Colorado's statutory form)

from the parents so that she could access the court file in preparing her documentary film, and

cases, a district court judge enjoined Ms. Shell (not a party to the case) from having contact

Ms. Shell believed this judicial order violated her right to freedom of association and

interfered with her First Amendment-protected preparation of a documentary film exposing

detailed recommendations to the court-appointed attorney, advising him what she thought he

should do to adequately represent the parents, and she provided a copy of her

5

recommendations to the parents. When the attorney refused to accept her advice, the parents

The Fremont District Court had found (without an evidentiary hearing based on notice) that

the pleadings were downloaded in part from Ms. Shell's website and perhaps from other

websites. Ms. Shell's trial judge(the special hearing master) in this contempt matter

appeared to accept the "findings" of the Fremont District Court as evidence of Ms. Shell's

involvement in the unauthorized practice of law. The Colorado Supreme Court then adopted

the findings of the hearing master, even though neither the hearing master or the Colorado

Supreme Court gave any indication they ever visited any of the websites about which the

witnesses testified, websites where sample pleadings were available.

The parents involved testified at trial that Ms. Shell did not advise them what to file,

that they each did their own research, that they talked with activists (identified by name) other

than Ms. Shell about what they should do, that Ms. Shell had no involvement in drafting their

pleadings and never discussed with them what they were or should be filing, and that they had

conducted internet research (they provided the web addresses at trial) and they found sample

pleadings online which they adapted to their own cases.

No one testified that Ms. Shell prepared or assisted in preparing legal documents for

anyone, yet the hearing master "found" that she did. Sample pleadings were shown to exist on

many websites, including that of Ms. Shell, and often the same material was available on

multiple websites. Witnesses testified they researched and downloaded materials, consulted

with persons other than Ms. Shell (and not with Ms. Shell), and drafted pleadings. There was

no evidence that Ms. Shell was involved. The hearing master made up that conclusion

6

without any factual basis. The Colorado Supreme Court allowed the findings ofthe hearing

master to stand, finding they were not clearly erroneous. But there was no transcript of Ms.

Shell's trial, only a videotape (and digital copies) which Ms. Shell had made of her trial, and

there was no statement in the Colorado Supreme Court opinion that any of the justices had

ever reviewed any portion of that videotape. Ms. Shell had been denied her request that the

state furnish her with a transcript ofher trial at state expense, because she was indigent, and

the Colorado Supreme Court found that any error in this denial was harmless and did not deny

Ms. Shell due process because it "did not impact this court's ability to consider the issues

Ms. Shell had argued in her Opening Brief:

Ms. Shell has been arbitrarily denied the due process

protections ofthe United States and Colorado Constitutions by this

court summarily denying her request that a transcript ofthe

proceedings be provided at state expense.

Ms. Shell is entitled to the transcripts at state expense if she

is indigent: "Justice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of

his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to participate

meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at

indigent defendant with a free transcript if it is needed on appeal.

389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967) (indigent defendant entitled to free

transcript of preliminary hearing for use at trial).

Opening Brief at 37.

The court very carefully stated that any error was harmless because Ms. Shell provided

the court with citations to the videotapes of the hearing and the court had the opportunity to

review those recordings "to the extent necessary to consider the issues raised in Shell's

7

reference in the Opinion to a single word of trial testimony actually reviewed by the court - and

Shell into a digital format, on DVDs. If the Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the

videotapes, as it says, it did so without reference to any citations at all. If it reviewed the

DVDs, there is no indication that it did. But any review of the proceedings makes it

abundantly clear that the hearing master's "findings" are unsupported by and contradicted by

the record. And the "record" of testimony in this trial is "unofficial."

The Colorado Supreme Court basically concedes that there is no evidence inthe record

that Ms. Shell assisted anyone in drafting their pleadings, and that any witness who testified

with actual knowledge testified that she had not. Nevertheless, the court concluded that

disbelieving what the witnesses testified to constituted proof of the opposite of what they had

presented pleadings that incorporated the legal arguments that Ms. Shell had given their courtappointed

attorney. But Ms. Shell testified that she had given the parent's copies of the letter

she sent to the attorney, and sample pleadings were widely available on the internet.

Providing copies of one's correspondence with an attorney, to a non-attorney, cannot

constitute the unauthorized practice oflaw. Neither can sending instructions to a lawyer.

Neither can posting sample pleadings used in other cases on the internet and advising readers

to consult with an attorney.

Ms. Shell demanded (but was denied) a jury trial for her punitive contempt proceeding

since she was facing possible imprisonment or fine, and since the prosecutor had not limited

8

the possible punishment she was facing to the punishment for a petty offense. Ms. Shell

argued that the prosecutor had asked the court to impose a punitive fine in excess of $5000,

knowing that Ms. Shell had been denied a jury trial. Colorado criminal law only authorizes

401, C.R.S. (fines over $5000 not authorized except for Class 1 through Class 6 felonies);

argued that "the right of a person who is accused of an offense other than a noncriminal traffic

infraction or offense ... to have a trial by jury is inviolate and a matter of substantive due

similarly unambiguous, in providing the right to ajury. C.R.Crim.P.23. Thefundamental

constitutional right to trial by jury is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States

288,612 P.2d 1153 (1980)."

Ms. Shell further argued in her Opening Brief:

within the definition of the crime itself a judgment about the

149 (1969). Where a law authorized a maximum fine of $1000, the

Supreme Court considered that a petty offense, not triggering the

right to a jury trial, because the maximum punishment was "well

below the $ 5,000 level set by Congress in its most recent definition

Indirect contempt proceedings (such as Ms. Shell's case) are

especially well-suited for jury determinations: "Alleged contempts

committed beyond the court's presence where the judge has no

personal knowledge of the material facts are especially suited for

trial by jury. A hearing must be held, witnesses must be called, and

9

evidence taken in any event. And often ... crucial facts are in close

dispute" (citation omitted)). Such contempts do not obstruct the

court's ability to adjudicate the proceedings before it, and the risk of

erroneous deprivation from the lack of a neutral factfinder may be

Where serious criminal contempt fines are imposed, a jury trial is

Court looks to see whether the state treats an offense is serious or

penalties, Nevada had not clearly categorized DUI as a serious

offense). If this court sought to impose a felony-level fine on Ms.

Shell, this court would have categorized this contempt as a "serious

offense", entitling Ms. Shell to a jury trial under the federal

constitution.

Opening Brief at 18-19.

The trial court (a hearing master) found Ms. Shell had wilfully disobeyed an order (the

stipulated injunction) of the court and recommended she be found in contempt of court and

recommended she be fined $6000. The Colorado Supreme Court did find her in contempt and

misdemeanors are punishable up to a maximum of two years injail with a maximum fine of

$5000. §18-1.3.50l, Colorado Revised Statutes (2006). $6000 fines are not possible except as

punishment for felonies. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected Ms. Shell's argument, despite

recognizing that the punishment imposed exceeds that for "petty" offenses, and despite the fact

that, in Colorado, all statutory criminal offenses beyond petty offenses are considered serious and

require jury trials, but it found that criminal contempt is not legislativelydefined and it

determined that contempt is neither serious nor petty because it does not carry a legislatively

10

categories of criminal offenses created by the General Assembly are not applicable to contempt

Based on this logic, Colorado can punish a person in contempt proceedings without

scheme considers all misdemeanors and felonies - - everything above a petty offense, for which

The court actually "found" the $6000 fine to be petty, despite its felony-level dimension.

Opinion at 24.

Colorado's reasoning leaves unanswered whether any criminal contempt proceeding in

that state can ever be considered serious enough to require a jury trial. Contempt proceedings

thus escape the constitutional limits of statutory criminal proceedings because criminal contempt

is undefined and discretionary. Such unfettered discretion is dangerous and a revolution was

The Colorado Supreme Court considered some of Ms. Shell's First Amendment

That court held that its own definition ofthe unauthorized practice of law was not

unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, even though its definition is more a list of examples,

court did not address Ms. Shell's evidence and argument that she had allowed another person to

law to prohibit non-lawyers from jointly filing their federal civil rights complaints - - even if one

11

the plaintiffs, and that the others just "join in." If so, a large number of civil rights suits could

perhaps be avoided through applying Colorado's logic, perhaps easing the case load in busy

Ms. Shell had argued in her Opening Brief:

The right to petition is one of "the most precious of the liberties

(1972). Where the state's restrictions against the unauthorized

practice of law impair significant First Amendment rights to

association and to petition for redress of grievances, those

same attorney was appointed for parents in both cases) testified to receiving Ms. Shell's heavyhanded

instructions as to how he should handle the cases, and to the fact that he never talked to

Ms. Shell, and to the fact that he ignored her directions and advice.

The witnesses who testified on behalf of Ms. Shell testified that she was not involved in

any way with their drafted pleadings. They described in some detail where they had gotten the

materials they used, and who they obtained their information from. They visited websites, where

pleadings were found. They talked to and obtained assistance from [well-known] activists in

California.

12

The hearing master wanted to find Ms. Shell guilty, and he did so despite uncontroverted

evidence that she did not assist in drafting pleadings or any parent or grandparent in presenting

their case, as was charged in this case. There is no official record in this case to cite to, because

the Colorado Supreme Court did not provide a transcript to an indigent defendant. But the video

record that Ms. Shell made of the trial proceedings (and which is preserved with the record,

testimony; he may have believed them too stupid - as, apparently, did the Fremont District Court

- to download materials from the internet and adapt them to their cases; he certainly agreed that

Ms. Shell's involvement with parents involved with dependency and neglect cases causes

consternation to courts and to county attorneys and to the department ofhuman services.

Ms. Shell is a passionate advocate for the rights of families and parents involved in

dependency and neglect cases, and a critic ofpublic officials. She is a documentary film

producer; a public speaker, a teacher at seminars (including legal education seminars for

lawyers), a host to a website; and much more. Her political speech and political activities are

undoubtedly annoying to public authorities, but they are activities protected by the First

Amendment and Colorado cannot be allowed to intimidate and silence her under the guise of

regulating the unauthorized practice of law. What she posts on the internet is readily available on

many other websites and is far less than what is available to any layperson in bookstores or

through orders from legal publishers, such as West and Lexis.

13

REASONS FOR ALLOWING THE WRIT

I. Ms. Shell is engaged in protected political expression and political association and

petitioning the government when she advocates for the rights of parents, and when she

criticizes and instructs court-appointed attorneys and whenshe hosts a website and posts

pleadings from other cases, and when she joins with others to sue the government for civil

rights violations, and Colorado cannot stifle such activities under the pretext of regulating

the unauthorized practice of law.

Ms. Shell has been charged with and found guilty of contempt of court in large part for

exercising her First Amendment rights to free speech, freedom of association, and the right to

petition the government for redress of grievances. She is a political activist highly critical of

state court actions and the actions of county attorneys and the department ofhuman services.

Those entities have lashed out against her and are using contempt proceedings in the Colorado

Supreme Court to suppress her criticisms. What Ms. Shell does in her passionate (and totally

uncompensated) efforts to advocate for and defend the rights of families and parents, is protected

by the First Amendment. She is not practicing law when she directs an attorney as to what she

thinks he should do for his clients, or when she tells the parents of her efforts. She is not

practicing law when she posts sample pleadings from other cases on the internet, with notices

that persons should consult with an attorney for legal advice before using such information. She

is not practicing law when she encourages parents to do their own research and stand up for their

rights. She is engaging in protected political association and expression.

When parents download materials from her website and the websites of others, despite

her disclaimers and warnings, Ms. Shell is not practicing law. When the parents download

14

materials from other websites, or from hers, they are exercising their responsibilities and

Colorado has no right to control or ban their efforts through punishing Ms. Shell. When two

non-lawyers choose to join in a federal civil rights lawsuit, as Ms. Shell did with a parent

involved in a dependency and neglect case where Ms. Shell had been told she could no longer

associate with that parent, and one ofthem takes the responsibility for doing most ofthe research

and for drafting the pleadings, that action cannot be prohibited under the guise of regulating the

unauthorized practice of law.

II. Colorado Should Not Be Allowed to Deny the Sixth Amendment-guaranteed right toa

jury trial in serious criminal contempt proceedings - - i.e., where the punishment is as

severe as fora state felony - - simply because Colorado does not call criminal contempt a

serious offense.

When a person is tried for criminal contempt in a state court and subjected to punishment

so severe that only felonies in that state carry such penalties, that is a serious contempt and a jury

trial is required to protect the rights of the accused. Undefined or arbitrarily-defined offenses - such

as criminal contempt in Colorado - -are not exempt from federal constitutional limitations.

The Colorado Supreme Court denied Ms. Shell a transcript that she could not afford (in

part because they price their transcripts so highly, much higher than the cost of transcripts in

lower state courts) so there is no official record ofher trial. That constitutes a denial ofdue

process and cannot be considered harmless.

Colorado should not be allowed to deny jury trials in contempt proceedings simply

because the Colorado Supreme Court (which defines contempt through its Colorado Rules of

Civil Procedure) does not consider contempt to be a serious offense, even though contempt

15

punishments may, as in this case, exceed the punishment for misdemeanors under state law.

The writ should be allowed.

Dated this 19th day of March, 2007.

Respectfully submitted,

~O(vr~

Paul Grant

6053 S. Quebec Street, # 101

Centennial, CO 80111

(303) 771-1908

Counsel for Petitioner

16

1. Opinion of the Colorado Supreme Court entered on December 18,2006.

17

NOTICE: [**1}

Petitioner: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, v.

Respondent: SUZANNE SHELL.

Case No. 04SA93

SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO

December 18, 2006, Decided

District Court for the District of Colorado. The

Pagel

HEADNOTES: Unauthorized Practice of court finds sufficient support in the record that

Law - Actions Constituting the Practice of Shell practiced law in these proceedings

Challenge to Ban on Unauthorized Practice violated Colorado law and a previous order

of Law - Sanctions for Unauthorized entered by this court enjoining her against the

Practice of Law in Colorado Federal Courts unauthorized practice of law.

- Judicial Estoppel - Right to Jury Trial in The court holds that Colorado's ban on the

Contempt Proceedings - Indigent's Access to unauthorized practice of law is constitutional

of Costs and Attorneys' Fees for Punitive applied in this case. In addition, the court

Contempt concludes that the ban extends to Shell's

SYLLABUS: In this original proceeding, the activities in the United States District Court for

supreme court holds Suzanne Shell in contempt the District of Colorado, where she filed and

and fines her $ 6,000 for her unauthorized attempted to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of

practice of law in two state court proceedings another person.

and a civil action filed in the United States The court further holds that Shell was not

entitled to a jury trial on the contempt charge as

a matter of statutory or constitutional law, and

rejects the claim that Shell has been deprived

of due process [**2] because she was not

provided with a free copy of a transcript of the

proceedings below. The court does not assess

costs and attorneys' fees against Shell because

the sanction imposed is punitive, not remedial,

in nature.

Counsel, James C. Coyle, Deputy Regulation

Counsel, Denver, Attorney for Petitioner.

Paul Grant, Centennial, Colorado, Attorney for

Respondent.

Opinion of the Court.

CONTEMPT FOUND

ENBANC

JUSTICE EID delivered the Opinion of the

Court.

This opinion considers the Presiding

Disciplinary Judge's recommendation that we

hold Respondent Suzanne Shell in contempt

and fine her $ 6,000 for engaging in the

unauthorized practice of law. We agree with

the Presiding Disciplinary Judge and issue the

contempt citation.

For the reasons explained below, we find

that Shell has practiced law without a license in

three separate legal proceedings since 2002,

and in so doing, she has violated both Colorado

law and a previous order entered by this court

enjoining her against the unauthorized practice

of law. Despite Shell's claims to the contrary,

Colorado's [**3] ban on the unauthorized

practice of law is constitutional and does not

We also disagree with Shell's assertions that

she was entitled to a jury trial and that she has

been deprived of due process because she was

not provided with a free copy of a transcript of

the proceedings below. While we fine Shell $

6,000 for her unauthorized practice of law, we

do not impose any additional amount for costs

Page 2

and attorneys' fees.

Suzanne Shell is an advocate committed to

exposing what she considers to be abuses of

process that occur in Colorado dependency and

neglect cases. Shell is not a licensed attorney,

however, and her advocacy previously has led

her to cross the line between permissible

activism and the unauthorized practice of law.

In May 2001, the Office of Attorney

Regulation Counsel ("OARC") petitioned this

court for an injunction and contempt citation

against Shell. The OARC alleged that Shell

engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by

providing legal advice to parents involved in

dependency and neglect cases, drafting

pleadings for parents' use, and attempting to

represent parents in judicial proceedings. Shell

denied the [**4] OARC's allegations and

claimed that she was entitled to provide legal

advice and represent the parents because they

had executed statutory powers of attorney

authorizing her to act as their agent.

Shortly thereafter, Shell and the OARC

entered into a "Stipulation" in which Shell

agreed to the entry of an injunction preventing

her from practicing law without a license in

Colorado. Shell made several

acknowledgments in the Stipulation, including

(1) that she was familiar with Colorado law

concerning the unauthorized practice of law,

(2) that the "practice of law" includes activities

such as offering legal advice and drafting or

selecting legal documents for use by another

person in a legal proceeding, and (3) that by

license, Shell committed the unauthorized

practice of law. Shell further acknowledged

that she was incorrect in her belief that a

statutory power of attorney allowed her to act

as the signing party's legal representative. Shell

agreed to pay administrative costs but the

OARC did not pursue any fine for contempt.

2001 (the "October 2001 Order"), accepting

Shell's Stipulation and enjoining her [**5]

against practicing law without a license in

Page 3

Colorado. The October 2001 Order

incorporated Shell's Stipulation by reference.

Since the October 2001 Order was entered,

Shell has been involved in two dependency and

neglect proceedings in Colorado state courts

and one civil action in the United States

District Court for the District of Colorado. The

OARC alleges that Shell engaged in the

unauthorized practice of law in each of these

cases, thereby violating Colorado law and our

October 2001 Order.

The K.M. Matter, 02JV97. Shell

participated in a Fremont County District Court

action involving K.M., the mother of an

allegedly dependent and neglected child. The

court appointed attorney Daniel Kender to

represent K.M. in May 2002.

Several months later, K.M. executed a

statutory power of attorney providing Shell

with broad powers to handle her affairs,

including the power to act "in [her] stead

regarding [her] Dependency and Neglect case."

Shell contacted Kender in January 2003 and

asked him to call her to discuss the K.M.

matter. Kender testified to the hearing master

below that he did not return Shell's call.

Shell subsequently sent a faxed letter to

Kender dated February 21, 2003. In [**6] the

letter, Shell informed Kender that she was

acting as an "agent" for K.M. "based upon the

Power of Attorney" executed several weeks

before. Shell stated that "[K.M.'s] legal

interests may not have been adequately

represented" by Kender and that "drastic action

is needed immediately to protect her rights to

parent her children." Attached to the letter was

a discovery request (specifically, a set of

requests for admissions) directed to the

caseworker assigned to the K.M. matter, the

guardian ad litem, and the West Central Mental

Health Center. Shell directed Kender to serve

the discovery request "no later than next

Tuesday," and explained that she "had great

success using admissions in the past." Kender

testified that he ignored Shell's letter and did

not serve the discovery request.

In March 2003, K.M., acting pro se and

Page 4

without Kender's knowledge, served a

discovery request on the caseworker, guardian

ad litem, and West Central Mental Health

Center. With the exception of very minor

differences, the requests served by KM. are

identical to the requests attached to Shell's

February 2003 letter to Kender. KM. also filed

a "Motion for Clarification of Effective

Assistance of Counsel" [**7] in which she

challenged Kender's representation of her

interests in the dependency and neglect action.

The district court struck KM.'s pro se

discovery request.

The A.F. Matter, 03JV3. While the KM.

matter was pending, Shell was involved in

another dependency and neglect proceeding in

Fremont County District Court, this one

concerning A.F., a respondent mother. The

court appointed Daniel Kender to represent

A.F. A.F. subsequently executed a power of

attorney authorizing Shell to act as her agent

and giving Shell the power to handle her legal

affairs.

As in the KM. matter, Shell sent Kender a

letter informing him that she had been engaged

as an "expert consultant" by A.F. Shell advised

Kender that her association with A.F. was

confidential and was not to be revealed. Shell

also gave Kender "information and

instructions" on the defense of A.F., stating that

she would provide Kender with "all the legal

arguments and documentation" he might need,

but admonished that they "will be useless" if

Kender "fail[ed] to make the necessary

arguments in court. " Shell then instructed

Kender to file specific documents and motions,

make specific legal arguments and tender

specific jury instructions. [**8] Shell also

informed Kender that he should serve requests

for admissions on the Department of Human

Services, and directed Kender to her website to

obtain a sample. Shell requested the

discovery before it was served. Kender testified

that he ignored Shell's letter.

As in the KM. matter, A.F. filed and

served pro se pleadings in her dependency and

neglect action, each of which reveals a level of

Page 5

sophistication that is nearly impossible to

attribute to A.F. given her lack of legal

training. Kender was unaware that these

pleadings had been filed and served by A.F.

The substance and style of A.Fo's pleadings are

strikingly similar to the language used in the

pleadings filed in K.M.'s action, and with two

trivial exceptions, A.F.'s "Motion for

Clarification of Effective Assistance of

Counsel" is identical to the same motion filed

by K.M. in her action.

In April 2003, the Fremont County

Department of Human Services requested that

the trial court add Shell as a special respondent

to the AF. matter for the purpose of enjoining

her against engaging in the unauthorized

practice of law. Shell filed suit in federal court

seeking an injunction preventing her from

The Federal Action, 03-RB-743. Shell filed

an action in the United States District Court for

the District of Colorado pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

section 1983 alleging that her civil rights--and

hose of A.F.--had been violated by eight

defendants, including the Fremont County

District Court and A.Fo's attorney, Daniel

Kender (the "Federal Action"). Both Shell and

AF. were named as plaintiffs, with Shell

purporting to represent AF. in the case. The

federal magistrate assigned to the case entered

an order on May 14, 2003, holding that Shell

"cannot represent [AF.] in this matter, nor may

[Shell] sign pleadings, motions, or other

documents in this case on [A.Fo's] behalf." The

magistrate ordered AF. to sign the complaint

as a pro se plaintiff.

Shell--again acting on behalf of A.F.--filed

a motion to reconsider, arguing that the

statutory power of attorney executed by A.F.

authorized Shell to act as AF.'s legal

representative. The district court denied Shell's

motion to reconsider. Subsequently, the court

dismissed the Federal Action for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a

The Proceedings Below. In March 2004,

the OARC petitioned this court to hold Shell in

contempt for violating the October 2001 Order

Page 6

and Colorado law prohibiting the unauthorized

practice of law. The OARC cited Shell's

activities in the K.M. matter, the AF. matter,

and the Federal Action to support its petition.

The Presiding Disciplinary Judge, acting as

a hearing master, held a hearing on the OARC's

petition and considered evidence and testimony

presented by both sides. Shell videotaped the

proceedings in their entirety.

Shell argued to the hearing master that

there was no direct evidence that she prepared

the pleadings and discovery requests filed and

served pro se by K.M. and AF., or that she

otherwise provided the respondent mothers

with legal advice. To support her claim, Shell

offered the testimony of K.M.'s mother's

boyfriend and A.F.'s mother. These relatives

testified that they prepared the pleadings and

discovery requests based on their research of

various internet websites, and that Shell neither

selected the documents nor advised the mothers

to file them.

The hearing master concluded that the

relatives' testimony was not credible in light of

the surrounding circumstantial [**11]

evidence presented by the OARC. First, the

hearing master found that it was virtually

impossible for K.M. and AF. to have prepared

their pleadings without assistance, given their

lack of legal training. Second, the hearing

master found implausible the notion that

relatives of two separate mothers involved in

two separate proceedings would draft virtually

identical pleadings and discovery requests.

Aside from Kender, who did not know about

the pro se filings until after they were served,

the only connection between K.M. and AF.

was Suzanne Shell.

In addition, both proceedings contained the

same sequence of events arising from Shell's

involvement as the mothers' representative. In

both cases, Shell sent a letter to Kender

purporting to act as the mothers' agent and

instructing Kender to take specific legal

measures. In both cases, Kender ignored Shell's

refusal to follow Shell's instructions led to the

Page 7

Based on its findings, the hearing master

recommended to this court that Shell be found

in contempt and fined $ 6,000. The hearing

master also recommended that Shell be

assessed an additional $ 5,409 for legal costs

and the OARC's attorneys' fees. Shell appealed

the hearing master's recommendations.

Prior to filing her opening brief in this

appeal, Shell requested a transcript of the

proceedings below, to be paid for at state

expense. Shell argued that indigence prevented

her from paying for the transcript. This court

denied Shell's motion.

In this appeal, Shell offers several reasons

for why the court should not accept the hearing

.master's recommendation, and we consider

them in tum.

Section II addresses Shell's claim that the

evidence presented below was inadequate to

support the hearing master's finding that she

engaged in the unauthorized practice [**13] of

law. As we explain, the evidence in the record

sufficiently supports the hearing master's

findings that Shell offered legal advice, drafted

legal pleadings and attempted to represent

another person in a judicial proceeding, all of

which constitute the practice of law.

In section III, we address Shell's defenses

against the enforcement of Colorado's ban on

the unauthorized practice of law against her in

this action. In particular, Shell claims that the

ban is unconstitutionally vague and violates the

Page 8

the court lacks jurisdiction to punish the

unauthorized practice of law in federal courts,

and that therefore we cannot hold her in

contempt for attempting to represent A.F. in the

Federal Action. Shell also urges that the

statutory powers of attorney executed by K.M.

and A.F. authorized her to to act as the mothers'

legal representative. We disagree with Shell on

each count.

In section IV of our opinion, we consider

Shell's claim that her right to a jury trial was

violated in this case. We hold that Shell was

not entitled to a jury trial because the

recommended fine is not sufficiently serious to

trigger Shell's constitutional right to [**14] a

jury trial, and because Shell has no independent

right to a jury trial under a Colorado statute.

Section V of the opinion addresses Shell's

assertion that her right to due process was

violated because she was denied a transcript of

the proceedings below for use in this appeal.

We find that any error resulting from the

failure to provide Shell with a transcript was

iarmless because it did not impact this court's

ability to consider the issues raised in Shell's

appeal.

Finally, in section VI, we explain why Shell

cannot be assessed costs and attorneys' fees as

a result of the contempt proceeding.

Consequently, we adopt the hearing master's

recommendation as to the citation of contempt

and the imposition of a $ 6,000 fine, but

decline to follow that recommendation with

respect to costs and attorneys' fees.

A.

[HNl] Colorado law prohibits the

unauthorized practice of law, i.e., the practice

of law by a person who is not a licensed

attorney in good standing with the State Bar.

[HN2] This court has the exclusive authority to

punish the unauthorized practice of law with

contempt. [**15] See id. Where an individual

previously has been enjoined by the court

against practicing law without a license,

Page 9

violations of that injunction are punishable in

contempt proceedings conducted pursuant to

contempt, as a punitive measure or to coerce

obedience, is an inherent and indispensable

power of the courts. ").

nl Shell argues in passing that the

proceedings below were constitutionally

insufficient. We find her claim meritless.

contemnor to notice of the charges and

an opportunity to respond at a trial on the

merits by cross-examining adverse

witnesses and by presenting evidence

of these protections in the proceedings

below, consistent with the demands of

law . . . in the prosecution of contempt,

except of that committed in open court,

requires that the accused should be

advised of the charges and have a

reasonable opportunity to meet them by

way of defense or explanation. " (citation

omitted)).

[HN4] We previously have defined the

"practice of law" as acting "in a representative

capacity in protecting, enforcing, or defending

the legal rights and duties of another and in

counselling, advising and assisting him in

connection with these rights and duties . . . ."

Applying this definition, we have held that an

unlicensed person engages in the unauthorized

practice of law by offering legal advice about a

specific case, drafting or selecting legal

pleadings for another's use in a judicial

Page 10

proceeding without the supervision of an

attorney, or holding oneself out as the

representative of another in a legal action. See

case-specific legal advice and selecting casespecific

legal documents constitutes the

1988) (same).

As we explained in Grimes, [HN5] we have

attempted to avoid any doubt about the

activities that constitute the "practice of law"

thorough [**17] "definition of what constitutes

the practice of law which is supported by longstanding

counsel, drafting documents and pleadings, and

interpreting and giving advice with respect to

the law," as well as "presenting cases before

B.

Applying the standard set forth above, the

hearing master found that Shell engaged in the

unauthorized practice of law by sending letters

to Kender directing him to follow her legal

advice. The hearing master also found that

Shell had advised K.M. and A.F. to file and

serve their pleadings and discovery requests

without the knowledge or approval of Kender,

and that Shell was instrumental in preparing or

selecting those pleadings and discovery. This,

too, constituted the unauthorized practice of

law. Finally, the hearing master found that

Shell engaged in the unauthorized practice of

law by attempting to represent A.F. in the

Federal Action.

[HN6] We accept the hearing master's

findings of fact unless they are so clearly

erroneous as not to find support in the record.

consideration of the record reveals that the

hearing master's findings were not clearly

erroneous, and we defer to the hearing master's

resolution of the conflicting facts in evidence.

The record sufficiently supports the finding

Page 11

that Shell engaged in the unauthorized practice

of law in the K.M. and A.F. matters. These

cases followed a remarkably similar pattern. In

both cases, Shell wrote letters to the mothers'

attorney instructing him to take specific legal

measures. In both cases, once Shell's

instructions were ignored, the mothers filed and

served pro se pleadings and discovery requests

without the knowledge or approval of their

attorney. The hearing master reasonably

concluded that these legal documents were the

direct result of Shell's involvement. As the

hearing master found, it was impossible for

K.M. and A.F. to have prepared their pleadings

and discovery requests without the assistance

of someone with legal experience in

reason that K.M. (or her family) would prepare

pleadings and discovery requests that were

nearly [*172] identical to pleadings and

discovery requests prepared by A.F. (or her

family). Not only were the documents [**19]

filed by K.M. and A.F. nearly identical, but

they incorporated many of the legal arguments

that Shell separately provided to Kender in her

letters. The only connection between K.M. and

A.F. other than their common attorney, who

had no knowledge of his clients' pro se filings,

was Shell. In light of this record, the hearing

master reasonably concluded that Shell was

providing legal advice to K.M. and A.F. and

was drafting legal documents for their use.

We acknowledge that conflicting evidence

was presented to the hearing master regarding

Shell's contact with K.M. and A.F. Specifically,

family members of K.M. and A.F. testified that

Shell had no involvement in drafting the

pleadings and discovery requests that the

mothers filed pro se. These family members

testified that they prepared the legal documents

based principally upon internet research. The

hearing master, however, concluded that the

family members' testimony was simply

incredible given the unlikelihood that two

separate families would prepare legal

documents that were virtually identical both to

one another and to the advice that Shell

provided to Kender in her letters. Since there is

Page 12

[**20] the family members' testimony, we

defer to the hearing master's factual conclusion

that Shell did in fact provide legal advice to

K.M. and A.F. and draft legal pleadings and

advice to K.M. and A.F. and preparing legal

documents for use in their dependency and

neglect proceedings constituted the

unauthorized practice of law. See C.R.C.P.

Beyond Shell's involvement in the two

dependency and neglect proceedings, there is

no question that Shell filed the Federal Action

on behalf of herself and A.F., and that she

subsequently filed a motion asserting her right

to prosecute A.F.'s claims in the Federal

Action. Drafting and filing a legal pleading on

behalf of another person and without a license

is clearly the unauthorized practice of law. See

Our review of the record reveals no reason

to disturb the hearing master's factual findings

that Shell engaged in the unauthorized practice

of law. These facts having been established, we

now turn [**21] to considering Shell's

challenge to the enforcement of the ban against

her in this case.

A.

Shell claims that Colorado's ban on the

unauthorized practice of law violates her right

to due process because it is unconstitutionally

vague, both on its face and as applied to her in

this case. We disagree.

[HN7] The vagueness doctrine is rooted in

the right to due process of law, which requires

that a law provide "fair notice of the conduct

that has been determined to be unlawful."

1986). Thus a law offends due process if "it

does not provide fair warning of the conduct

prohibited or if its standards are so ill-defined

as to create a danger of arbitrary and capricious

Page 13

law "is not void for vagueness if it fairly

describes the conduct forbidden, and persons of

common intelligence can readily understand its

meaning and application." Id. Shell bears the

burden of establishing the unconstitutional

vagueness of our ban on the unauthorized

practice of law beyond a reasonable doubt. See

1999). [**22]

Furthermore, [HN8] for Shell to succeed on

her challenge that the ban is facially void for

vagueness, she must show that it is

incomprehensible in all of its applications. See

Shell's claim immediately fails this test,

because C.R.C.P. 201.3(2)(b) unambiguously

defines the practice of law to include "drafting

documents and pleadings," "giving advice with

respect to the law," and "presenting cases

before courts"--in other words, exactly the

activities in which Shell engaged in the K.M.

matter, the A.F. matter, and the Federal Action.

[*173] were not pulled from thin air, but were

grounded in prior decisions of this court

describing the nature of the practice of law. See

authority"). [HN9] We believe that the

controlling caselaw are specific enough to

provide a person of common intelligence with

notice of what [**23] activities constitute the

practice of law, and thus the ban on the

unauthorized practice of law is not facially void

vagueness challenge where law was

"sufficiently specific to provide the

constitutionally required guidance to

individuals seeking to comply with the law ...

.").

unconstitutionally vague as applied to her

similarly fails. [HNIO] To prevail, Shell must

show that the ban on the unauthorized practice

Page 14

of law "does not, with sufficient clarity,

prohibit the conduct against which it is