Dear All,

 

I just wanted to let you know that it was Renee Cygan (also known as Re-Mark, and now, Billy Wiseman  who tried to sign up on one of the groups I own as Billy Wiseman.

 

The reason why she wanted to sign up as Billy Wiseman was because she was not allowed to sign up on FAIP unmoderated.  She wanted to respond to Re-Mark's sympathetic postings to an ex-client's derogatory remarks (no pun intended) about her ex-attorney.  Re-Mark responded without any direct knowledge as to the real facts as to why this ex-client ended up with her case being dropped; lack of standing to appeal her case; or why lawyers wouldn't take her appeal or call her back.  It is obvious that something with this ex-client's case isn't right.

 

Re-Mark was clearly trying to insinuate that there was something wrong with her original attorney even though Re-Mark had never used his services to make such unfounded libelous remarks.

 

This attorney corrected the nonsense story of his ex-client with the real circumstances which he posted to my group.  That is why the new and improved  Re-Markabilly tried to join my group only heshe didn't know that I would reject her request.

 

How do I know this.  Well, Billy writes things such as "this site is under major constriction, enjoy your vist."  While Re-Markabilly a tad more literate, has a propensity to misspell the same words wrong with diligent consistency as sissy5211@... has done over the years.  Hence, she gives her multiple-personality creation away.  So now we are dealing with "the three faces of Eve syndrome or could it be "Sybil." who is doing the writing on the Lies Unfold.  Sort of an appropriate promotion for he-she-he, don't you think?  Its simply remarkabilly!  Now, let's take it one step further - Misty, what was the IP address of the wikipedia sock puppet?  Oh no, that is getting lengthy to have to keep adding on to this identity - would it be ReMarkabillydot?

 

It is a little odd that both Dorothy and Billy changed their screen names when there was a Re-Mark standing by to be made!

effie

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45? :+} okay One story is a car accident another is that you jumped out of a second story window.  The result has left you brain damaged with a reduced intellectual rate. You have stated to some that your brother is in jail for internet hacking and that you were put into foster care and raised there being abused there as much as you were by your mother. effie You don't find any of this Libel??  If you think I would slip up and tell my age your nuts...There is one thing you said that was truthful "if you get mixed up in the wrong crowd, it can ruin your life" I'm not mixed up with you or any of your group so I should be fine. In the mean time don't make threats as it won't make me like you anymore Than I don't now. Billy.
 

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On August 12, 1998, department investigators
Sandra Lok and Patricia Galante, in response to an
August 6, 1998 anonymous complaint alleging overcapacity,
made a surprise inspection visit to the plaintiff’s
facility. The plaintiff signed a consent to inspect form
and admitted the inspectors.
Upon entering the facility, the inspectors noted that
ten children and three adult women were present. The
plaintiff explained that two of the children were not
under her care, but were only visiting the center with
their mother. Shortly thereafter, those two children left
the facility with one of the women. The plaintiff further
told the investigators that another of the children was
not a day care client, but was being cared for and given
piano lessons by the other woman, who was the plaintiff’s
daughter, Courtney.
As Lok and Galante began conducting their inspection,
the plaintiff made two telephone calls to women
named Renee and Linda. She told them both that the
inspectors were at her facility pursuing an overcapacity
complaint and advised them to implement a telephone
chain to alert other providers. Shortly thereafter, a
woman identifying herself as Linda Simpson2 arrived at
the facility to pick up one of the remaining eight children.
She explained that she was that child’s regular
day care provider and that she had just returned
from vacation.
The inspectors requested that the plaintiff provide
them with enrollment records for the children in her
care. The plaintiff complied, and the inspectors viewed
the records, which they found to be incomplete. The
plaintiff and Lok left the basement to inspect the upper
floor of the residence while Galante and Courtney
stayed in the basement with the remaining seven children.
Galante continued to review the records and to
inspect the basement area.
No violations were identified in the other parts of
the residence, and the plaintiff and Lok returned to the
basement. The inspectors asked her to produce the
records they found lacking, and informed her that she
was being cited for overcapacity and incomplete
records. The plaintiff began to search for the records.
As she searched, Galante noticed a calendar on the
wall, on which were inscribed names of children and
instructors on the various days. Galante copied some
of the information from the calendar to her notepad.
That action concerned the plaintiff, who believed that
Galante was acting outside of her authority and violating
the plaintiff’s and the children’s civil rights
because she considered the information confidential.
The plaintiff tried to see what Galante had written
down, but Galante would not allow it.
The inspectors thereafter informed the plaintiff that
the visit was over and requested that she sign a complaint
investigation form. They apprised her that she
would be provided with copies of some of the
paperwork generated by the visit and could request
anything she required further pursuant to the Freedom
of Information Act.3 The plaintiff, believing that she was
receiving unfair and illegal treatment, called the police.
She told the inspectors that they were to stay until the
police arrived, then latched the door through which the
inspectors had entered and stood in front of it. The
inspectors remained at the plaintiff’s facility until a
police officer arrived some ten to fifteen minutes later.
Newtown police officer Steve Ketchum arrived to
find a ‘‘great deal of commotion’’ in the basement. As
he tried to ascertain what had occurred, the plaintiff
moved between him and the inspectors, speaking in a
loud voice and gesturing at Galante and Lok. Ketchum
moved the plaintiff aside and spoke with her for some
time. He then interviewed Galante and Lok outside,
speaking with each of them individually. Ketchum then
consulted with his supervisor and requested additional
assistance. When another officer arrived, the two
entered the facility and informed the plaintiff that she
was being arrested for disorderly conduct. After
arrangements were made for someone else to supervise
the children, the plaintiff was escorted outside, handcuffed
and brought to the police station.






Precedent indicates that in the interest of protecting
the public health, requiring consent to certain searches
is an appropriate condition under similar circumstances.
See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913
(9th Cir. 1973) (consent to airport search valid condition
for engaging in air travel); State v. Taylor, 12 Conn.
App. 427, 433, 531 A.2d 157 (1987) (consent to Breathalyzer
test valid condition for maintaining driver’s
license). We conclude, therefore, that the plaintiff has
not sustained her heavy burden of proving that the
regulations allowing for inspections of family day care
centers are unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
1 General Statutes § 19a-77 (a) (3) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A ‘family
day care home’ . . . consists of a private family home caring for not more
than six children, including the provider’s own children not in school full
time . . . . During the regular school year, a maximum of three additional
children who are in school full time, including the provider’s own children,
shall be permitted, except that if the provider has more than three children
who are in school full time, all of the provider’s children shall be permitted
. . . .’’
2 The department later determined that this name was false.
3 See General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 1-18a et seq., now § 1-200 et seq.
4 The hearing officer found that the plaintiff had violated Regs., Conn.
State Agencies §§ 19a-87b-5 (d) (1) (A) (terms of registration); 19a-87b-5 (e)
(infant and toddler restriction); 19a-87b-6 (b) (health); 19a-87b-6 (e) (personal
qualities); 19a-87b-7 (e) (household environment); 19a-87b-10 (a)
(capacity); 19a-87b-10 (b) (1) (enrollment form); 19a-87b-10 (b) (2) (general
health record); 19a-87b-10 (b) (3) (written permission from the parent); 19a-
87b-10 (h) (3) (immediate attention); 19a-87b-13 (b) (inspection of facility);
and 19a-87b-13 (c) (inspection of records).
5 General Statutes § 4-183 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Appeal to Superior
Court. (a) A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available
within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to
the Superior Court as provided in this section. . . .’’
6 General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The court shall
not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the
agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing
have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions,
or decisions are . . . (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary
or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion. If the court finds such prejudice, it shall sustain the
appeal and, if appropriate, may render a judgment under subsection (k) of
this section or remand the case for further proceedings. For purposes of
this section, a remand is a final judgment.’’
7 At the combined hearing on the summary suspension and proposed
revocation of her license, and on appeal, the plaintiff argued that the department’s
discretion to summarily suspend her license is narrower than its
discretion to revoke the license and, therefore, the hearing officer was bound
to consider the evidence pursuant to the more narrow standard. Specifically,
the plaintiff claims that the hearing officer was limited to considering only
whether the events of August 12, 1998, endangered the children’s health,
safety or welfare. We disagree.
It is true that pursuant to subsection (c) of General Statutes § 4-182, which
governs matters involving licenses, summary suspension of a license is
authorized ‘‘[i]f the agency finds that public health, safety or welfare imperatively
requires emergency action . . . .’’ Pursuant to General Statutes (Rev.
to 1997) § 19a-87e (a) and the regulations promulgated thereunder, however,
‘‘[t]he Commissioner of Public Health shall have the discretion to refuse to
license . . . a person to own, conduct, operate or maintain a family day
care home . . . or to suspend or revoke the license . . . if the person who
owns, conducts, maintains or operates the home . . . either fails to substantially
comply with the regulations . . . or conducts, operates or maintains
the home in a manner which endangers the health, safety and welfare of
the children receiving child day care services. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
Nothing in the statutory scheme governing family day care requires that
a license first be suspended before it is revoked. The plaintiff requested
that both her summary suspension and the proposed revocation be the
subject of the same hearing. Pursuant to § 19a-87e, revocation is an authorized
response to a provider’s substantial noncompliance with the regulations
governing family day care facilities. Thus, the plaintiff’s prior refusal to fully
admit inspectors and her recordkeeping violations properly were subjects
of the hearing.
In addressing the plaintiff’s claims, we will employ the standard of § 19a-
87e and will limit the discussion to whether the department properly revoked
her license because the issue of whether it properly summarily suspended
her license is moot. ‘‘An issue is moot when the court can no longer grant
any practical relief.’’ Twichell v. Guite, 53 Conn. App. 42, 52, 728 A.2d 1121
(1999). Because the plaintiff’s license already has been revoked, a finding that
the summary suspension was improper would afford her no practical relief.
8 The fourth amendment to the United States constitution provides that
‘‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or things to be seized.’’
9 Contrary to the plaintiff’s assertions, authorization for inspections pursuant
to the regulations is not limited to emergency situations, nor is the
state’s interest limited to addressing imminent threats to day care children.
See Regs., Conn. State Agencies §§ 19a-87b-13, 19a-87b-14. As such, the
plaintiff’s attempt to cast her challenge to the regulations authorizing inspections
as an ‘‘as applied’’ challenge rather than as a facial attack is misplaced.